Jinwan Park is a non -resident scholarship holder of James A. Kelly Korea at the Pacific Forum and a non -resident scholarship holder at the European Center for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna.
At 11:22 a.m., on April 4, 122 days of the declaration of martial law, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea issued its verdict to maintain the request for the dismissal of the National Assembly against President Yoon Suk Yeol, actually removing him from his functions. While political parties recalibrate their strategies in this new environment, the acting president Han Duck-Soo leads the nation until the presidential election scheduled for June 3.
Reactions to the court’s decision
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About two hours after the announcement of the Constitutional Court, President Yoon issuing A declaration through his lawyers expressing his gratitude to those who had “supported and applauded” and describes his presidential service as an honor for the nation and its citizens. In particular the absence of this declaration was any recognition of the decision of the Constitutional Court or any mention of excuse concerning the national and international crisis triggered by its declaration of martial law, although it refrain from publicly challenging the verdict.
The main Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) welcomed The decision of the Constitutional Court with an enthusiasm measured. The leader Lee Jae-Myung congratulated Korean citizens for their role in the preservation of democratic institutions and is committed to serving as a headlight of hope. The party has expressed a notable restraint in its use of stories, referring to ad hominem criticism and excessive emotional exhibitions, a position apparently calibrated with the next presidential election in the mind.
The Power Party (PPP) in power, which mainly took part with President Yoon throughout this process, initially responded with disappointment, several criticism of private criticism of the Constitutional Court. However, the head of the PPP, Kwon Young-Se, former Minister of Unification, issuing A more nuanced statement affirming the respect of the party for the court’s decision to preserve democratic institutions and legal standards, despite disagreements.
The main advantages and challenges of the opposition
The withdrawal of Yoon undoubtedly benefits the DPK and its leader, Lee Jae-Myung, who lost to Yoon less than a percentage in the 2022 elections. Recent results of the survey by survey by Falsification And Kingdom Demonstrate the public feeling promoting the opposition, with more than half of the respondents (52% and 56.9%, respectively) preferring an opposition victory in the next elections. Lee leads significantly among potential candidates, although bidirectional surveys with potential conservative candidates indicate stricter breeds.
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Lee is recent acquittal Accusations of violation of the law of elections before the Court of Appeal, canceling the decision of the lower court, also strengthens its position. At the same time, he still faces four other criminal investigations as well as the potential decision of the Supreme Court. However, the decision of the Supreme Court on his case will probably come after the June elections, because these decisions generally take several months, and there is significant political pressure on the judiciary to resolve the issue before the presidential race.
Despite these advantages, the DPK must recognize that its recent electoral successes in the recent by -elections and the 2024 general elections Largely inserted anti-Yoon feeling rather than real enthusiasm for the party itself. The DPK campaign during these elections focused mainly on presidential scandals and public skepticism of its domestic policies and its character rather than the articulation of a positive vision.
Developing and communicating a clear governance philosophy beyond the simple anti-PPP rhetoric is important not only to win the upcoming elections, but also to establish public legitimacy which could prevent national disorders similar to the future.
The conservative dilemma
With the repercussions of President Yoon, the conservative PPP is now faced with a difficult balance between the distancing of the administration of Yoon to use independent voters and maintain loyalty to its inheritance to preserve the support of basic constituents.
In particular, the support of the PPP has increase From low-20s to high-30s since December, largely by mobilizing hardcore supporters who believed in Yoon’s innocence and opposed DPK’s strategy to constantly draw the acting presidents. This coincided with the growing popularity of the members of the cabinet, notably the former Minister of Employment and Labor Kim Moon-Soo, who remained faithful to the president and defended the declaration of the martial law.
With this, the indictment of Yoon presents to the PPP a strategic choice to continue to prioritize the main supporters who remain at the heart of their current political survival or travel the self -employed with more moderate rhetoric for electoral success. Recent electoral defeats and the proven importance of independent voters to determine the electoral results in the history of Korean policy can push the party to centrism.
If the PPP finally decides to rotate, the next primary of the party presents an opportunity to present a distinct vision of the inheritance of Yoon. Notable figures from the center-right as Former PPP chief Han Dong-Hoon And legislator Ahn Cheol-Soo should compete and the fierce competition among About ten candidates Will probably draw particular attention from the public – for better or for worse – a notable contrast with the situation of the Democratic Party. The weighting of the votes of party members in relation to public investigations of the general public in the primary will signal in which direction the party intends to continue.
Perspectives for a third resurgence of force?
The emergence of a viable “third force“Defaining it with bipartite domination seems unlikely given the limited time and the absence of new convincing political figures to mobilize voters and independent defectors from the two parties. Although about a fifth of Korean citizens identify As an indebtedness – resisting a third party among young voters – the fatigue and skepticism of the voters have developed due to the repeated model of third -party candidates who finally merge with the major parties for political negotiation.
Party candidates, such as Lee Jun-Seok of the reform party, could consider this as an opportunity to increase their minimum support (currently below 5%) or to negotiate significant concessions during campaigns to increase the presence of the party in central policy.
Basic challenges persist
In the midst of these new political developments, the main challenges of Korean society intensified during the crisis of martial law. The polarization between the supporters of the two main parties only aggravates, with the Attitudinal analysis in 2025 of the Eastern Asia Institute On political polarization revealing alarming levels of antipathy between the partisan blocks among their supporters, the notes of disapproval towards the opposing parts exceeding 93%. Most respondents also expressed pessimism as to the reduction of this polarization.
This intensification, coming from politically constructed stories which systematically see adversaries and hierarchy the discourse focused on the scandal rather than substantial political debates, has ironically led to Improvement of approval ratings For the two main parties compared to the pre-cardial period. Such trends have effectively decreased incentives to abandon the political strategies of confrontation which have proven to be effective. At the same time, these measures fail to capture the growing disenchantment among independent voters, many of whom have completely withdrew from political commitment.
The path to reconciliation
The coming months will attend an interaction between stability derived from increased political predictability and increased confrontation inherent in electoral competition. Whatever the presidential succession, however, it remains crucial that political leaders and civil society recognize the deeply rooted challenges of polarization and societal antagonism and consider in collaboration a “Korea” reconceptualized capable of rebuilding public confidence in governance and democratic institutions.
The accusation verdict offers a national reflection opportunity rather than just closing a chapter in Korean political history. The nation must seize this chance to ensure that such a crisis is never repeated. Here, political parties and decision -makers must go beyond their mutual animosity to create significant governance visions that can guide Korea towards its future direction.
Korean society, from political leadership to ordinary citizens, must endeavor to embrace and cultivate the art of compromise and reconciliation as central democratic values, thus ending the cycle of self-perpetuation of political reprisals and the paralysis of governance threatening institutional legitimacy, the dynamics which contributed both to the declaration of marked law.