Among the persistent mysteries of the 2024 elections are the roots of the political gap of the modern sexes, especially among young people. Although their final voting choices are a little more nuanced than certain pre -electoral polls, young men and women, aged 18 to 29, had the greatest divergence of their vote among age groups. The men of generation Z supported Donald Trump by 14 percentage points; Women of generation Z supported Kamala Harris by 17 points, by A post-electoral analysis.
These dynamics, in particular the aggressive right change Young men have raised interesting questions: what laughed at this fracture? Something in particular moving the young men to the right while pushing young women to the left? Could it be the old-fashioned manosphere, economy or sexism?
Or could it be something else, like the apparent resurgence of organized religion?
As I reported, the rapid decline of religiosity in the United States has been Slow down. In particular from the pandemic, the data show that generation Z no longer pursues the rapid drop in religious affiliation, in particular Christianity, which began with previous generations. If anything, religious belief has seen a little renewal with this younger cohort.
This change suggests a curious dynamic in play among young people in America. While generation Z has been increasingly polarized on gender, the same goes for their religious affiliation. These tendencies suggest that modern politics and religious beliefs can have some self-reproducing effect on each other: while young men find faith and religious affiliation, their policy also derives towards law, in turn reinforcing their existing beliefs.
The opposite seems to be true with young women: religious customs do not joke with their political and social beliefs, push them out of churches and strengthen this drift of certain organized religions.
These religious trends count. While the religious and political convictions of young men and women move away from each other, it is not only complicated by electoral choices, but the future of family life, meetings and social belonging.
The religious gap of the sexes changes
The last 10 years have seen American Christianity below. After a constant drop in Christian religiousness since the 1990s, Christian belief has started to stabilize at around 60% of the American adult population – still a historic low point – on the turn of the 2020s.
A key contributor to this slowdown seems to be generation Z. After years of successive generations that lose their religion, generation Z seemed to become as irreligious as it could be. Now what we have seen since 2020 is a kind of dead cat rebound: a Slightly higher level of Christian religious affiliation Among the youngest adults. Among the youngest cohort of generation Z, those born between 2000 and 2006, the part that identifies itself as a Christian since 2023, from 45% to 51, According to the Pew Research Center. And overall, generation Z seems to be more Christian than the previous trend lines predicted that they should be: 46% compared to 41%.
At the heart of this judgment and a slight reversal is a double dynamic: young women leave religious congregations, while the identification and religious practice of young men increase. These changes are found in several ways.
First, the gap between the sexes in religious participation has not only evaporated in recent years, but has been reversed. The religious and scientific researcher of Ryan Burge data has found in his analysis survey data of the cooperative electoral study according to which women frequented religious services more regularly than men, the reverse occurs now. Among the cohort born in the 1990s and 2000s, it is the men who are NOW Women in weekly attendance.
Looking at other reference points suggests something similar. Young women are more likely Let young men say that they are not religious affiliated, according to the American Enterprise Institute inquiry on research on American life. Young women are now also likely that young men say that religion is “not so important“For them – a significant development since women are traditionally more fervent believers. And the religious gap between the sexes among the youngest cohort seems to shrink in other respects too: Whatever religion they identify with, young women and young men report the same daily prayer rates. For older generations, women greatly exceed men, praying daily.
Does religion make men more conservative?
We could always endure better data on what is going on. It could be that young men remain simply as religious as the older generations of men (while women lose religion), or that men become more religious in general, or that men are particularly faithful to organized religion. Some data suggest that young women remain religious or spiritual, but simply do not identify with the churches organized in the same way as men do. But the religious gap of the sexes still seems to change among Gen Z.
But does politics stimulate these changes in religious behavior and belief? Or does religion stimulate stronger political convictions? The data is a little less definitive here, but two things seem to confirm: according to the AEI inquiry center, the young women who leave the churches report Doing it because the beliefs of their congregations are more conservative than the beliefs they hold. Churches are out of step with most young women.
In addition, the young Christians who remain in their churches are even more likely to be liberal and to have progressive beliefs than young Christian men. Even if they remain Christians, they become more politically liberal.
Underlying all this is the fact that women of generation Z are more likely to identify themselves as feminists, LGBTQ and support for abortion rights. According to the Pew Religious Landscape Survey, young Christians are 13 points more likely than young men to say that abortion should be legal. They are 18 points more likely to support gay marriage and 26 points more likely to accept LGBTQ people.
As researcher Daniel A. Cox points out of the AEI Investigation Center, these are all changes to what young Christians believed 10 years ago. “The gap between the sexes in the views of abortion has since quadrupled,” he notes in A recent analysisBut with regard to opinions on gay homosexuality and marriage, it seems that young men have evolved well. “Young Christians have hardly changed their point of view in the last decade, while young men have become less favorable.”
On a range of other points of view of the government, political parties and ideology in general, what is happening with non -religious young people also occurs among believers. Young Christians are much more liberal and more likely to be a democrats than young Christian men. Cox notes that it is perhaps not religion that makes these political opinions so different, but the extent to which young Christian women have more links and exposure to various communities and consume different types of media. Young religious men seem to be stuck in more homogeneous environments, both in the digital world and in the real world, he suggests.
However, while we can With confidence, young women are becoming more and more liberal and less religious in this process, we cannot say the same thing for men. Religion may or may not make young men more conservative, but it seems likely that their conservative religious and political convictions are at least guard Young men in churches. This seems to slow down their derives from organized religion.
All of this should complicate the future not only of the social and cultural ties of Gen Z to each other but also to those of future generations. It is the youngest cohort of generation Z, those born between 2000 and 2006, which narrows the gaps of religious gender while widening political gaps. This poses problems for their social, romantic and family future. Gen Z already reports to socialize, dating,, maintain healthy relationsAnd fighter solitude. Wedding rates continue to drop. So, while young men and women move away from each other, it is difficult to see how the potential partners are targeting these divisions. And these dynamics can very well have electoral effects.